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THE CROSS NATIONAL MEMORIAL:
AT THE INTERSECTION OF
SPEECH AND RELIGION
Mary Jean Dolant
INTRODUCTION

As the expanding concept of government speech has increasingly
succeeded as a defense to private speech claims under the Free
Speech Clause, questions abound as to how this will affect the
existing doctrinal maze of public religiously themed speech. This
Symposium Article explores and reflects on these questions using two
frames: Justice Souter's final opinion on "government speech" and
the underanalyzed 2002 National Memorial designation of the
Mojave Cross war memorial.
Among his parting words on this topic, Justice Souter observed:
"The interaction between the 'government speech doctrine' and
Establishment Clause principles has not ... begun to be worked out
... [and] it may not be easy to work out."' These words may sound

puzzling to some. Establishment Clause claims, after all, frequently
involve determining whether the speech should be attributed to a
private speaker or the government.2 And so, whatever novelty exists,
it derives from his use of the specific term "government speech

t Assistant Professor, John Marshall Law School; BA, magna cum laude, University of
Notre Dame; JD, cum laude, Northwestern University School of Law. Thanks to the editors of
the Case Western Reserve Law Review for the invitation to participate in this Symposium on
Government Speech and their hard work. Additional thanks to my co-panelists on the
Establishment Clause & Government Speech panel, Douglas Laycock and Caroline Mala
Corbin, and to panel moderator, Jessie Hill, for inspiration. I also appreciate the opportunity to
present an early version of parts of this work at the First Annual Law & Religion Roundtable at
Brooklyn Law School, June, 2010. Finally, thanks to Tom Keefe and Megan Price for help with
the National Memorials research, and to Jeff Gaster for research assistance on this paper.
I Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment) (emphasis added).
2 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) ("[Tlhere is a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect." (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (opinion of
O'Conner, J.))).
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doctrine," which perhaps is better conceptualized as the "government
speech defense."
Before their departure from the Court, both Justice Souter and
Justice Stevens described this "recently minted" doctrine as
consisting of a narrow canon of cases, including Rust v. Sullivan3 and
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,4 and now PleasantGrove City
v. Summum, 5 in which "government speech" was asserted to rebuff a
Free Speech Clause claim.6 The general idea is that governments must
"speak" in order to govern, and that doing so necessarily requires
expressing the political viewpoint they were elected to promote. And
so, even where private persons create or transmit the speech, their role
does not trigger application of First Amendment speech protectionsor require government viewpoint neutrality.8
The intersection of religion and speech is complicated by the fact
that the two doctrines work in opposite directions. Turning again to
Justice Souter's observations in Summum, he explained it as follows:
In Establishment Clause cases-where government is required to be
neutral, and so seeks to avoid appearing to express a religious
message-it typically increases the numbers of speech objects, for

3 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding limiting federal funding to only those family planning
clinics which agreed not to permit abortion counseling).
4 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (denying a compelled speech claim, although the targeted tax in
dispute paid for pro-beef ads that appeared to be sponsored by the industry).
5 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (holding that the placement of a privately sponsored monument
in a public park was government speech not subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
6 See id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("To date, our decisions relying on the recently
minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my
view, of doubtful merit."); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The governmentspeech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise."). Justices Stevens and Souter
also viewed the widely criticized public employee speech case, Garcetti v. Cebellos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006), as involving the "government speech doctrine." Johanns, 129 S. Ct. at 1139
(Stevens, J., concurring); see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437-38. In an earlier article, I analyzed three
lines of cases, sometimes all referred to as "government speech" decisions, and argued that
Garcetti can be distinguished, though perhaps not defended, as involving somewhat different,
managerial interests. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: The
Establishment Clause Limits After Summumn, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 14-34 (2010)
[hereinafter Dolan, Government Identity Speech] (referring to the three cases listed in the text as
"core" government speech). That Article also analyzed at length the subtle differences between
the binary choice of speaker in "government speech" cases and the more graduated options used
in Establishment Clause cases.
7 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 ("A government entity has the right to 'speak for itself."'
(quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000))).
8 Id. The doctrine has been highly criticized by First Amendment scholars; and the facts
of the first two cases were particularly inflammatory. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the
First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing To Say?, 95
IOWA L. REv. 1259 (2010) (questioning the necessity of the new government speech doctrine);
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 168, n.103 (1996) (collecting articles
criticizing Rust); Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 317, 321 n.26 (2007) (collecting articles criticizing Johanns).
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the purpose of diluting any religious meaning9 (think of the cr6che
surrounded by snowmen and carolers upheld in Lynch).'0 But, he
explained, the more objects on display, the harder it then becomes to
argue that each one conveys a governmental message. As a result, by
taking steps to ward off an Establishment Clause violation, the
government risks creating a private speech forum-which, in turn,
means losing its "government speech" defense, and thus, being forced
to include unwanted messages in its display or program." Under
forum doctrine, where a government opens up previously nonpublic
property, access or funds to private speakers, it is allowed to set
reasonable content or speaker limitations, but the First Amendment
requires it to remain viewpoint neutral in administering those

categories.12
The interaction between the changing speech and religion
doctrines is currently framed by two recent, almost inverse, Supreme
Court cases. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a Free Speech
Clause case, the Court allowed the City to use the new "government
speech" defense to reject a small religion's "Seven Aphorisms"
marker, while maintaining a donated Ten Commandments monument
among its park's permanent collection.13 While public attention and
commentary focused on the unequal treatment of two religious
symbols,14 the Establishment Clause was not at issue there. Instead,
the Court analyzed whether, by accepting numerous private
monument donations over the years, the City had created a
"permanent monument forum" for private speech.' 5 The 9-0 decision
held that monuments displayed in public parks are government
speech, so that the government may express its own viewpoint
through such displays.16
The second, Salazar v. Buono,17 was an Establishment Clause
case. There, a majority of the Court seemed to approve of privatizing
a World War I cross memorial as a means of curing its previously
9 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring).
10 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation when the city displayed a Christmas cr6che alongside other holiday-themed
decorations, such as a Santa statue, reindeer pulling a sleigh, and carolers).
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring).
12Id. at 1137.
13 Id. at 1138.
14 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, 10 Commandments vs. 7 Aphorisms: A New Religion Covets
Legitimacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A14 ("[T]he subtext of the battle-a New Age
religion seeking the same treatment as a more established faith."); Editorial, A Case of Religious
Discrimination,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A30 (arguing that "[p]ublic property ... must be
open to all religions on an equal basis-or open to none at all").
15Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-34.
16 Id. at 1134.
17 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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adjudicated Establishment Clause violation, while also averting the
disrespect arguably conveyed by forced removal.' 8 Procedurally
complex and lasting over a decade, 9 Buono did not include a Free
Speech claim, but the courts' analysis of the cross's meaning did
include some related "government speech." Soon after Buono filed
his Establishment Clause claim, Congress designated the
controversial cross in the Mojave Desert as a "National Memorial"
commemorating U.S. participation in World War 1.20 As discussed
below, while the Justices mistakenly assumed that this Christian
symbol was the only national monument honoring America's WWI
soldiers, they avoided the constitutional issue by construing the land
transfer statute as allowing removal of the cross.2 1
Therefore, while neither case presented an immediate need for
answers, both Summum and Buono raised questions about the
intersection of speech and religion-foreshadowing a more direct
collision between two shifting doctrines. One way of framing the
analysis is by evaluating the pensive puzzle left behind by Justice
Souter:
But the government could well argue, as a development of
government speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own
views, it is free of the Establishment Clause's stricture
against discriminating among religious sects or groups....
Whether that view turns out to be sound is more than I can
22
say at this point.
Given his long history of championing strict religious neutrality, 23 this
statement from his Summum concurrence is fairly interpreted as a
prediction, not a proposal.
18Id. at 1820.
19The litigation has generated five published decisions and is now on remand in the
district court. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono 1), aff'd, 371
F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono 11); Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(Buono III), ajJ'dsub. nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV),
rev'dsub. nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Buono).
20 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat.
2230, 2278 (2002).
21 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817-18, 1823 (Alito, J., concurring); see also discussion infra
Part III.
22 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). This statement was all the more puzzling because the majority opinion
expressly noted, in passing, "government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause."
Id. at 1132.
2 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 737 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality toward religion as a general rule);
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) ("'A proper respect for both the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality'
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This Symposium Article examines the multiple interpretations of
Justice Souter's parting words by exploring hypothetical illustrations
of the anticipated, post-Summum clash of doctrines. In doing so, it
builds on two prior papers with more normative agendas. In an article
analyzing Summum, I applied Professor Lawrence Lessig's work on
social meaning to argue that the opinion exacerbates the
Establishment Clause impact of religious-historical public symbols.2 4
Especially given the changed, more combative culture, I proposed
drawing a sharp line between preserving monuments erected in more
homogenous times-which should be allowed only if accompanied
by sufficient explanatory disclaimers-and new government display
of religious symbols, which generally should be prohibited. 25 A
second article, commenting on the Buono decision, showed how
Justices Kennedy and Alito's opinions could be interpreted as using
an "expanded endorsement test."2 6 By their account, the "reasonable
observer" would understand that government action to avoid
destroying or removing a historic-religious symbol conveys a
different message than would a government's erection of a Christian
symbol today.27
It is this distinction between old and new-with its intriguing hint
focused my attention on
of an achievable compromise 2 8-that
Congress's 2002 designation of the Mojave Desert Cross as a
"National Memorial" commemorating World War I. Although
occurring during the Buono Establishment Clause litigation, it was
not directly at issue in the case. Accordingly, and because the
complicated procedural maneuverings took center stage, this

toward religion . . . .' (quoting Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413

U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973))).
24 See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra 6, at 52-57 (discussing how the
government speech label more clearly "ties" the government to a monument, while
extinguishing the private donor's role "de-ambiguates" the monument's social meaning) (citing
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 949 (1995)).
25 Id at 65-69 (providing extensive, detailed requirements for such disclaimers, and
caveats for situations where new minority-religion monuments are proposed to dilute an older
monument's religious meaning).
26 Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2010).
27Id at 46 (also suggesting that this may be the most viewer-centered alternative
available, given the current, more conservative Court, and the lesser option of a reductive, fixed
historical approach).
28 Based on their opinions in Buono and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), six
Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) are
likely to resist ripping out longstanding religious statuary from public squares. See, e.g., Salazar
v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) ("The goal of avoiding
governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public
realm").
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religiously themed government speech was underanalyzed. One
unique contribution of this Article is new research on the Mojave
Cross designation, the general process for creating National
Memorials, and the broader range of WWI national memorials.2 9
Interesting in its own right, simply for the additional light cast on a
recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause case, this National
Memorial designation also provides a platform from which to explore
the puzzle presented. Because the designation process turns out to
involve substantial private participation-and to be somewhat ad hoc,
nonselective, and political-it provides a nice hypothetical. While
admittedly a long shot, it is a useful exercise to imagine a rejected
speaker claiming that Congress has created a "National Memorial
forum" and then suing, in the alternative, on both Free Speech and
Establishment Clause grounds. As explained below, there are other
credible candidates for WWI National Memorials, including a
longstanding secular monument and a tribute to Jewish WWI
veterans.
The examples worked through in this Article show that the
addition of a Free Speech Clause "government speech" defense is
likely to provide a mostly incremental, evidentiary difference. As
compared to that common Establishment Clause actor, the offended
observer, a rejected speaker-plaintiff, standing alone, will tend to
function as a truth-tester for a government's proffered secular
rationale. But even so, the added punch of forcing a government to
argue affirmatively that a particular religion-and not the rejected
other-best symbolizes the government's identity should prove even
harder to justify. 30 In a doctrinal area as notoriously contextual as the
29 All this original research on National Memorials, including the Mojave Cross
designation discussed in Buono, was sent to the attorneys for both parties (Counsels of Record
in the Salazar v. Buono District Court remand) upon completion in July, 2010; also, in October,
2010, when the unpublished research paper was posted on SSRN, see Mary Jean Dolan, P.S.
Untold Stories and the Cross National Memorial (Oct. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-1697483,copies were mailed to both Counsel and
the District Court Judge.
30 Note that Summum did attempt to force the City into this position, by asking the
Supreme Court to require the City to official adopt the meaning of the Ten Commandments as
its own message, but the Court declined to do. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct.
1125, 1134 (2009). That case, however, did not involve a binary choice, or even the Ten
Commandments, specifically, but rather the First Amendment categorization, generally, of all
donated monuments displayed in the City's Pioneer Park (and, by extension, all donated
monuments in public parks).
This Article brackets two types of government religious speech, legislative prayer
(allowed as uniquely historical) and "ceremonial deism" (historical practices, e.g., the use of
"under God" on U.S. currency, which have been explained away as rote phrases that have lost
religious significance over time). While each can be distinguished from the symbols analyzed in
Summum and Buono based on their unique features, to do so would require extended
explanation, which would be distracting here. For comprehensive analysis of these two issues,
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Establishment Clause, it is more effective to show, rather than to
simply tell, these conclusions.
First, this Article briefly reviews how Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum expanded the "government speech doctrine" to include
broad "identity" messages. The second Section explores several
possible interpretations of Justice Souter's melancholy reflections.
Third, the Article provides the necessary background from Salazar v.
Buono. Next, the Article sets forth the new National Memorial
research and evaluates whether the Mojave Cross National Memorial,
standing alone, violates the Establishment Clause. Finally, the last
Section considers what would be added to the analysis if Congress
were to refuse National Memorial status to the alternative WWI
symbols, while continuing to bestow that honor on the small cross in
the desert.
I. A BRIEF PERSPECTIVE ON SUMMUM'S EXPANSION
OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum is especially significant because,
for the first time, the Court extended the developing "government
speech doctrine" to situations where the government joins with
private partners to express broad, thematic government "identity
messages."31 Earlier cases upheld "government speech" defenses
against Free Speech Clause claims that involved established federal
programs, which had specific, objective government policies (antiabortion and promoting beef consumption).32 Summum also,

see, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: CeremonialDeism and Change
in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2009); Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayerand
the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsement, 94 MINN. L. REv. 972 (2010).
31 See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 4 ("'[I]dentity speech' can be
loosely defined as expression that is consistent with a government's identified or desired image
and values, especially communitarian and promotional themes."); Brief of Amicus Curiae
International Municipal Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter IMLA Brief] (IMLA's
"Municipal Practice Examples" showed how governments' decisions regarding monuments
"express community ideals at the time of installation."). For supporting quotes from the
Summum opinion, see infra note 37.
32 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (holding that a compelled
subsidy to pay for pro-beef advertising was protected government speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that a prohibition of Title X funding recipients from providing
abortion counseling did not violate the First Amendment). The Circuit Courts, however, have
been dealing with claims of broad, thematic "government speech" for some time, see, e.g., Ariz.
Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (specialty license plates); Wells v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (private sponsors and city's
holiday display), but the Court did not address or adopt the Circuit Courts' government speech
tests.
Also, in a related doctrine, the "speech selection cases," the Court has allowed the
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correspondingly, relaxed the "government control" requirement for
messages originating with a private speaker, finding "final approval
authority" to be sufficient. 3
In some ways, Summum was an easy case, as indicated by its 9-0
outcome. The Tenth Circuit held that because the City had displayed
some donated monuments in its public park, and parks are traditional
public forums for speech, it was required to display all private
monuments on a content-neutral basis. 34 While this seemed a
ridiculous outcome, the Court also declined to use limited public
forum analysis, even though it seemed applicable. 35 Atypically,
Pleasant Grove City had a reasonably consistent practice, later put
into a written policy, of displaying in Pioneer Park only donations
that either related to local history or were contributed by local
organizations. Summum, a small religion based in Salt Lake City (and
an experienced Ten Commandments litigator), fit neither category.
Nonetheless, allowing a government to use "content limitations,"
such as "local history," would have been of little use in the monument
context. Governments sought to be free of "viewpoint neutrality" too,
in order to defend standard monument-context decisions, such as
erecting a war memorial, but declining a statue portraying the war's
foreign casualties.3 6
And so, the Court's decision in Summum emphasized that, in
choosing to accept and display privately donated monuments, a
government intends to convey some message-and that message is

government to make content-based-but not viewpoint-based-decisions regarding which
private speakers to feature or fund when it acts in certain institutional capacities. See, e.g., Nat'l
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that requiring the NEA to take
into consideration respect for diverse beliefs in determining grant applications did not violate
Free Speech Clause); see also Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 14-24
(discussing the several types of "government speech" cases in depth). In fact, a wide variety of
constitutional cases can be characterized as involving questions of government speech. See, e.g.,
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377 (2001) (analyzing eight categories of cases in which government speech problems
have arisen); Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 833 (2010) (analyzing
numerous cases involving expression that is attributed, or misattributed, to the government).
3 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61). In contrast, the
Johanns opinion had emphasized the government's control over "every word" of the beef
advertisement. Johanns,544 U.S. at 561-62.
3 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
3s The limited public forum doctrine allows government to open up its property, but only
for certain, specified types of content or speakers. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499
F.3d 1170, 1171, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc). For an in-depth explanation and critique of the Summum Court's treatment of forum
doctrine, see Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 40-44.
36Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137-38 (deciding that forum analysis was unworkable because
then, by accepting the Statue of Liberty, the United States would have been obligated to accept
and display a "Statue of Autocracy").
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one which the decision makers have determined is consistent with the
relevant community's desired image and perceived identity. The
Court also stressed that governments are "selective" in deciding
whether to accept a donation because they do not wish to display
"permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do
not wish to be associated."38 The opinion also relied heavily on the
conclusion that observers will "reasonably" interpret donated
monuments "as conveying some message on the [government]
property owner's behalf." 39
In many expressive contexts with mixed public-private roles
(including permanent monuments in public parks), something like the
government speech doctrine seems necessary-or at least a good fit
with intuitively appealing outcomes.40 But it is not only legal scholars
who appear discomfited by the lack of limits on government speech,
particularly given the broad concepts the Court used in Summum. The
Justices, too, appear to be groping for ways to replace the fading lines
of forum doctrine with an alternative means of cabining governmental
discretion.4 ' Justice Alito, for example, noted with approval Pleasant
Grove City's now-written criteria for monument selection.42 But this
is a red herring because: (i) these criteria would not have provided the
very discretion that was granted by the Summum decision, and
(ii) written policies are not likely to become the norm in this sporadic
context, where years, and administrations, may pass before the next
installation, or offer, of a new monument.
Justice Breyer's concurrence proposed his own rule: governments'
monument selections must be made according to "criteria reasonably

37 Three key statements from the Court's opinion support this characterization. First, the
Court wrote that whether a government commissions a monument, or displays a privately
financed or initiated monument, "it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill
some feeling in those who see the structure." Id. at 1133. One main reason for finding that
Pleasant Grove's monuments were "government speech" was that: "[t]he City has selected those
monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park... ." Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). And again,
the City's actions-taking ownership and putting the monument on permanent display in a park
"that is linked to the City's identity ... unmistakably signify[] to all Park visitors that the City
intends the monument to speak on its behalf" Id at 1134 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 1133.
3 Id. ("In this context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate the
identity of the speaker.").
4 Compare Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253 (2011)
(suggesting an alternative "speech platform" paradigm); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public
Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357 (2001) (arguing for validity of limits on indecent
and offensive speech in certain types of limited public forums).
41 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665) (noting
Justice Kennedy's reference to the forum analysis alternatives as a "tyranny of labels").
42 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
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related" to the park's "legitimate ends."43 Their laudatory goal, it
seems, is to limit the risk that the "government speech doctrine" will
be used to disguise, or excuse, governmental religious discrimination
and other unconstitutional acts. This Article suggests that a rejected,
nonmajority-religion speaker, who cannot be explained away by a
religion-neutral criterion, may serve that purpose well.
II. EXAMINING JUSTICE SOUTER'S PENSIVE PUZZLE
Returning to Justice Souter's thought-provoking words, this
Section examines the possible meanings of his conjecture that the
developing government speech doctrine may allow government to
argue: "when [government] expresses its own views, it is free of the
Establishment Clause's stricture against discriminating among
religious sects or groups ..." Because this "doctrine" refers to a
government's defense to a Free Speech Clause claim, the
confrontation doctrines will be most clear where, in a single lawsuit,
the plaintiff claims both a Free Speech violation-e.g., based on
exclusion from an alleged forum-and also claims that if the
government asserts the "government speech" defense, then its speech
violates the Establishment Clause by favoring one religion over
another.45
The question after Summum was what, if anything, its government
speech holding would add if Summum also claimed that the City's
Ten Commandments display violates the Establishment Clause. The
commentators were split, but many agreed (often grudgingly, to be
sure) with Justice Scalia's preemptive proclamation: the Summum
decision would not change the outcome, based on Van Orden.46 in
Van Orden, a plurality dismissed an offended observer's
Establishment Clause challenge to a donated Ten Commandments'
display on the Texas Capitol grounds, based on its allegedly secular
43 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to "legitimate ends"
such as "recreational, historical, educational, aesthetic, and other civic interests"). Justice
Breyer's suggestion also appears potentially underinclusive.
44 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
45 To sharpen the judicial focus further, it is also helpful to assume the same (or a
relatively similar) government decision maker and social-cultural environment. Then, the Court
would be directly reviewing a government's binary, affirmative choice (e.g., "yes" to the
Eagles' Ten Commandments, "no" to the Summum's Seven Aphorisms).
6 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139-40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 690 (2005)); see also Nelson Tebbe, Privatizingand Publicizing Speech, 104 Nw. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009) (concluding that an Establishment Clause challenge to Pleasant
Grove City's Ten Commandments display would not succeed due to Van Orden). But see Ian
Bartrun, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. REv. IN
BRIEF 43 (2009) (concluding that Van Orden is insufficient to deflect a claim that Pleasant
Grove's Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause).
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historical purpose, and not by finding it private speech.47 An
intermediate perspective might be that the presence of a rejected
minority-religion speaker would make an Establishment Claim
violation more likely, even given Van Orden.
But in addition, I tend to think that in some circumstances, the
very process of requiring a government first to argue on behalf of the
religiously themed speech-to claim it affirmatively as representing
the government's own viewpoint-sometimes will make a difference.
It may expose a government's bluff. Where a case sits at the
intersection of the government speech doctrine and Establishment
Clause constraints, and both issues are before the court, the
combination of arguments may act to flush out government's
religious preferences. The following series of hypotheticals, all of
which are based on the concept of replaying the Pleasant Grove v.
Summum lawsuit, illustrate the range of possible meanings of Justice
Souter's words.
A. Scenario #1: No Secular Reason OfferedGovernment Openly States Its Religious Viewpoint
In the two decades leading up to Justice Souter's Summum
concurrence, there was a significant shift toward allowing a greater
blend between church and state.48 Accordingly, Justice Souter's quote
may simply express concern over the future success of Justice
Scalia's stated view: that the Establishment Clause permits
governments to express their preference for monotheism and the God
of the Bible. Imagine if Pleasant Grove City had rejected
Summum's Seven Aphorisms on the grounds that they are
blasphemous. (Interestingly, it actually is a tenet of the Summum
religion that God has proclaimed the Aphorisms superior to the
Commandments.') If the City then prevailed, using the "government
speech defense," then the new doctrine truly would have capsized
47 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690. Justice Breyer's controlling concurrence, however,
undermines this view. Not only did he employ the endorsement test, with an added focus on the
divisiveness of forced removal, id at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring), but he relied in part on
viewers' perception of a secular message based on the identity of the donor, the Eagles. Id. at
701-02. See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 30-32 (discussing this aspect
of J. Breyer's opinion).
48 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Vestiges ofthe Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L.
REV. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that the new Court will continue the trend of abandoning traditional
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in favor of the integration of church and state).
49 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(proclaiming that government is entitled to honor the Ten Commandments, in part because
97.7% of Americans believe that these rules were given by God).
5 See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, SUMMUM, http://www.
summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Mar. 26,2011).
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settled Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Such an extreme
outcome, however, seems both unlikely and more easily attributed to
cultural/political pressure than to the evolution of this particular
judicial doctrine."
B. Scenario #2: The Secular Reason Is a "Viewpoint-Neutral"
Application ofReasonable "Content Limitations"
On one account, the Summum facts themselves constitute religious
discrimination; all that was missing was an Establishment Clause
claim. 52 But there, the City had provided a reasonable, religionneutral rationale: the Ten Commandments monument was donated by
a local organization, which was one of the two criteria for display in
the Park, and Summum was not local, nor did its monument depict
local history.53 So, even with an Establishment Clause claim, there
would be no call for the City to risk asserting that, based on the
government speech doctrine, it was now "free" to express its own
discriminatory views on religion.
C. Scenario #3: The Stated SecularReason Is ViewpointDiscriminatory,but May be Justified
Without Reference to Religion
Next consider a situation where the rejected, religiously themed
display did relate to Pleasant Grove City's local history, but in an
objectively negative way. Assume, hypothetically, that the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS),
which continues to practice polygamy today, had deep roots in the
City, although for decades its members had lived in a remote
location. Imagine that the FLDS descendants of the City's original
s' See, e.g., Gregory A. Boyd, THE MYTH OF A CHRISTIAN NATION: HOW THE QUEST FOR
POLITICAL POWER IS DESTROYING THE CHURCH (2005) (setting forth the players and the

problems); Teddy Davis & Matt Loffman, Sarah Palin's 'Christian Nation' Remarks Spark
Debate, ABC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sarah-palin-sparks-churchstate-separation-debate/story?id=10419289 (discussing the ensuing debate sparked when
conservative politician Sarah Palin called America a "Christian Nation" and noted that she
rejects separation of church and state).
52 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars ofReligion: The Needfor a Tolerant
FirstAmendment, 62 ME. L. REv. 23 (2010).
s3 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129-30.
5 Note that Pleasant Grove City is one of the original Mormon settlements, started by a
group commissioned for that purpose by Brigham Young himself. See PleasantGrove History,
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, http://www.plgrove.org/arts-a-education/pleasant-grove-history (last
visited Mar. 20, 2011). Mormon polygamy has a longstanding, but highly controversial history.
Outlawing this religious practice was a condition of Utah statehood; the required renunciation
split the Church; and the splinter group, the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints (FLDS), still engages in polygamy today. See MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM,
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settlers donated a statute of a man with many wives and children for
display in the park, and the City rejected this offer. Application of a
viewpoint-neutral "local history" criterion would not help the City
prevail in court, but the government speech defense approved in
Summum would.
This could be one type of case to which Justice Souter referred,
because the City's rejection of the FLDS statue would be viewed by
some as government discrimination against a disliked religious
group. 5 But the statue honors conduct that has been unlawful for over
a century, and which portrays a painful chapter in Utah history. It
seems more likely a court would hold that drawing this distinction is
unrelated to religious discrimination, and therefore does not violate
the Establishment Clause.
Similar doctrinal conflict can be anticipated in the current context
of increasing expressive activism by atheist organizations. The legally
interesting case is where a government rejects antagonistic speech,
specifically, speech that arguably attacks others' religious beliefs.5 6
Actually, one of the first Circuit Court "government speech" cases,
Wells v. City and County of Denver, held that Denver's holiday
display was government speech.57 The court thus allowed the city to
exclude an atheist group's sign, which declared: "[t]here are no gods"
and "the 'Christ Child' is a religious myth."58 Arguably, the
government's response was religion-neutral, done to preserve the
display's celebratory spirit, rather than to malign atheism. 59

http://www.mormonfundamentalism.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (providing a historical
and doctrinal examination of Mormon Fundamentalism). For a thorough account of Mormon
polygamy, from its origins in the early 19th Century to current fundamentalist outposts, see
RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY (2d ed. 1989).

5s A growing number of legal scholars are criticizing laws banning polygamy as based in
religious and cultural discrimination. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold
Story ofAmerica's Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287 (2010); Jonathan Turley,
Polygamy Laws Expose Our Own Hypocrisy, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (Oct. 3, 2004),
http://jonathanturley.org/2007/08/20/polygamy-laws-expose-our-own-hypocrisy/.
56 See, e.g., Mallory Simon, Missing Atheist Sign Found in Washington State, CNN.COM
(Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/12/05/atheists.christmas/ (last visited May 4,
2011) (story about, and photo of, a large sign posted by the Freedom From Religion Foundation,
alongside a Nativity scene in a holiday display at the State of Washington Legislative Building,
stating: "There are no gods.... Religion is but myth and superstition that hardens hearts and
enslaves minds").
5 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).
5Id.

at 1137.

59Id.
9 Of course, any time a government asserts an ostensibly religion-neutral rationale for
excluding a minority group's message on religion, the use of such fine distinctions will be
controversial, especially where the group faces discrimination even where engaged in
expression that is clearly context-appropriate. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelieversand
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D. Scenario #4: The StatedSecular Reason Is ViewpointDiscriminatory,and Cannot ClearlyBe Justified
Without Reference to Religion
The core problem identified by Justice Souter will present where
there are no easy escapes: no relatively objective, secular reason that
is clearly distinct from religious preference. The clash of doctrines is
most apparent where a government relies on Summum's broad
"government identity speech" concept, but its asserted reason for
selection cannot be distinguished from the community's religious
identity.
To illustrate, suppose that Pleasant Grove City was offered two
religious symbols for display. The Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints' (LDS or Mormons) headquarters donated a large replica
of the golden plates (a central aspect of the Mormon foundation
story). 0 Around the same time, the descendants of the City's first
non-Mormon church donated a similarly sized Christian cross, with a
plaque explaining its local historical import. Say the City chose to
display the golden plates, and reject the cross-and then defended its
* 61
decision as a closer fit with the City's image.
If the City asserted government speech as its defense to the nonMormon church's Free Speech Clause claim, this would be a
paradigmatic example of "government identity speech" that cannot be
explained without reference to religion. And so, the City would be in
the precise position Justice Souter described, arguing to the court that
because the monument-display decision was "government speech," it
was entitled to express its own and the community's viewpoint-in
favor of the Mormon-majority plates. Because such an affirmative act
of religious preference would violate the Establishment Clause, to
defend this result, the government would need to argue that under the
new government speech doctrine, "when [government] expresses its

Government Religious Speech, 97 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.
com/abstract=1797804 (describing discrimination faced by atheists in America).
6 LDS stands for The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints; the LDS
headquarters is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. For a brief history, see http://lds.org/church
history/history/0, 15486,3943-1-2104,00.html.
61 Note that the Christian cross is not a central symbol for Mormons. See Am. Atheists,
Inc. v. Duncan, No. 08-4061, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26936 at *26 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 2010)
(holding that Utah Highway Patrol's 12-foot memorial crosses on shoulder of highway violated
the Establishment Clause). Recall the Court's explanations in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City:
"The City has selected those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park." 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1134 (2009) (emphasis added).
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own views, it is free of the Establishment Clause's stricture against
discriminating among religious sects or groups."62
Of course, the more disliked, unusual, or small the religious
minority group whose symbol the government would like to reject,
the more seductive this approach will be. To continue this thought
experiment, what if Summum hadbeen a local minority religion, with
its historical origins in Pleasant Grove City? The City likely still
would have preferred to reject the Seven Aphorisms monument based
on the group's unusual-but not illegal-practices (e.g., mummifying
household pets and worshiping in a backyard pyramid 6 3). Exploring
these points of intersection, between the government speech defense
and the norm of government neutrality on religion, reveals the
difficulties ahead. 4
III. BUoNo's CROSSED SIGNALS: TRANSFERRING THE LAND,
YET CREATING A NEW NATIONAL MEMORIAL

Salazar v. Buono stretched over a decade of procedurally complex
litigation, and yielded six Supreme Court opinions, but still resulted in
remand with directions to the district court to re-do its "endorsement
test" analysis. 65 This Section provides only a brief sketch-just
enough to provide background for the National Memorial issue, and
to show the endorsement test's current contours.
At issue was Congress's attempt to transfer to a private owner, the
local Veterans of Foreign Wars ("VFW"), the parcel of federal land
underneath the challenged cross war memorial. 6 The original white
cross on Sunrise Rock was erected in 1934 by a group of World War I
veterans, members of the VFW post in this remote area. Originally,
the cross bore a sign that identified it as a war memorial, and set out
its origin. Over the years, the cross was replaced, but the sign was
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring).
See Modern Mummification for Pets & Animals, SUMMUM, http://www.summum.us/
mummification/pets/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
64 This Article is directed at the questions rather than potential solutions, and thus, I will
not discuss here the efficacy of various proposals, including the disclaimer idea on which I have
previously written. Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supranote 6, at 49-73.
65 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Kennedy, J., plurality); id. at 1821 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (two-sentence opinion calling the sale an "empty ritual"); id (Alito, J.,
concurring) (objecting to remand); id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by J. Thomas)
(Buono lacked standing to appeal Buono IV); id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting on merits)
(joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor); id at 1842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (based on the
"law of injunctions," Court should have deferred to district court's interpretation of its
injunction).
6 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815-16 (noting that the proposed land swap is with a private
citizen named Harry Sandoz, who has agreed to transfer the land to the VFW, as part of his
promise to his dying friend, one of the WWI veterans who erected the original cross memorial).
67 Id at 1812.
62
63
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not; and most years, the site was used for a sunrise Easter service.68 In
1994, Congress designated a large swath of desert, including this
location, as the "Mojave Desert Preserve."
When Frank Buono sued, asserting that allowing a cross display on
federal land violated the Establishment Clause, the federal district
court agreed and enjoined the cross's continued display.7 0 During this
time period, Congress responded to the lawsuit by passing a bill that
prohibited using federal funds to remove the cross.n Then, while
Buono I was pending, Congress passed the 2002 National Memorial
Act, which provided:
The five-foot-tall white cross first erected by the Veterans
of Foreign Wars of the United States in 1934 .. .now located
within the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve ... is

hereby designated as a national memorial commemorating
United States participation in World War I and honoring the
American veterans of that war.72
The Act also required the government to acquire and install a
replica of the original wooden cross and the 1934 plaque, using up to
$10,000 of funds appropriated for administration of the Mojave
Desert Preserve. The original plaque, which was to be replicated,
Id
See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, § 502, 108 Stat.
4471, 4890 (establishing the Mojave National Preserve). A "National Preserve" works to
preserve open space similarly to a "National Park," while continuing to allow more private uses
of the land. See generally U.S. NAT'L PARK SERVICE (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.nps.gov/
(providing information about the National Park Service).
The government's passivity toward a cross on federal land for so many decades prior to
this litigation may suggest tacit approval, but it actually is quite ambiguous in the context of
Western land-use practices. According to an article on controversies over the use of presidential
declarations of National Monuments, "[a]pproximately 27.7% of the land area of the United
States, or some 630 million acres, is under federal ownership," and "[h]istorically, absent
withdrawal or reservation for specific purposes, federal lands were considered to be in the
public domain," originally, open for settlement, and generally, open for public use. Albert C.
Lin, Clinton's NationalMonuments: A Democrat'sUndemocraticActs?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707,
68

69

709 (2002) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 208 (121st ed. 2001)).
70 Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d. 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono 1), af'd, 371 F.3d
543 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono II).
n See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-230 (2000) ("None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of
the Interior to remove the five-foot tall white cross located within the boundary of the Mojave
National Preserve .... ).
72 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115
Stat. 2230, 2278 (2002).
7 Id. § 8137(c) ("The Secretary of the Interior shall use not more than $10,000 of funds
available for the administration of the Mojave National Preserve to acquire a replica of the
original memorial plaque and cross placed at the national World War I memorial designated by
subsection (a) and to install the plaque in a suitable location on the grounds of the memorial.").
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had declared: "The Cross, Erected in Memory of the Dead of All
Wars," and "Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of Foregin [sic]
Wars, Death Valley post 2884."74 Finally, to avert removal of the
Cross on a long-term basis, Congress enacted the Land Transfer
Act.s When Frank Buono went back to court to stop the proposed
land transfer, the district court issued a permanent injunction against
its implementation, finding that Congress's transfer statute was an
illicit attempt to evade the court's original injunction. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, bringing the validity of the land transfer before the
Court in Buono.
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion reversed and remanded,
strongly urging the district court to conclude that once the cross was
on private land, the reasonable observer would no longer view the
cross as conveying governmental endorsement of Christianity.n Both
the plurality and Justice Alito's concurrence emphasized that a
government's effort to preserve a religious symbol with a specific,
secular, historical meaning is unlikely to be viewed by a "well8
informed observer" as a government endorsement of religion. They
also agreed that the social meaning of a symbol derives from its
historical era; when erected, the Cross's meaning as a WWI war
memorial would have been clearly evident.79 Significantly, Justice
74 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (quoting Buono v. Kempthorne,
527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008)).
7s 16 U.S.C. §410aaa-56 (2006). Additionally, in 2003, Congress had passed another bill
prohibiting the cross's removal. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002).
76 Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Buono III), aff'd
sub. nom. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV), rev'd sub. nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Buono).
" Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) ("The court made no inquiry
into the effect that knowledge of the transfer of the land to private ownership would have had on
any perceived governmental endorsement of religion.").
78See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring) (the "well-informed observer"
would appreciate that the land transfer was the government's attempt to "eliminate any
perception of religious sponsorship," while avoiding the "disturbing symbolism associated with
the destruction of the historic monument."); id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). For
additional textual support for this interpretation, along with discussion of the limitations of such
an "expanded" endorsement test, see Dolan, Endorsement andHistory, supranote 26.
7 Noting that the original reason WWI veterans installed the cross was "to commemorate
American war dead," Justice Alito wrote:

[P]articularly for those with searching memories of The Great War, the symbol that
was selected, a plain unadorned white cross, no doubt evoked the unforgettable
image of the white crosses, row on row, that marked the final resting places of so
many American soldiers who fell in that conflict.
Id at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also id at 1820
(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) ("It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking
the graves of Americans who fell in battles...."); cf Cemeteries, AMERICAN BATTLE
MONUMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries.php (last visited Mar.

HeinOnline -- 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1187 2010-2011

1188

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

Alito noted that a reasonable observer could easily distinguish the
social meaning of the transfer of a 70-year-old cross war memorial
from the new "construction of an official World War I memorial on
the National Mall."so Stressing "the highly fact-specific nature" of a
"proper" endorsement inquiry, the Court remanded the issue to the
district court for consideration of "all of the pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement."
Congress's 2002 designation of the Mojave Cross as a "National
Memorial" seems particularly "pertinent" to unraveling this multilayered controversy.82 The lower court opinions, and the majority of
Justices who addressed it, focused on whether it meant that, even
post-land transfer, the federal government would retain control over
the land and the cross.83 The Justices dismissed its impact by means
of statutory construction, relying on the text of the controversial
reversionary clause in the Land Transfer Act. That clause required the
VFW to maintain the land as "a" WWI war memorial." Ignoring the
clear implications of the long saga to keep the Mojave Cross on
Sunrise Rock, they concluded that the Land Transfer Act gave the

28, 2011) (providing lists and photos of overseas military cemeteries).
s0 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[A] reasonable observer would not
view the land exchange as the equivalent of the construction of an official World War I
memorial on the National Mall"). These hints of Justices Alito and Kennedy's opinions are
important because each is likely to continue playing key roles in future decisions involving
religion.
81 Id at 1819-20 (plurality opinion) (stating that the district court should do this inquiry
"in the first instance").
82 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115
Stat. 2230, 2278-79 (2002).
83 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819-20; Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 779 (9th Cir. 2008)
(Buono IV).
84 The relevant provision of the 2003 Land Transfer Act appeared to restrict future use of
the property only to use as "a" war memorial (and not, specifically, as the "white cross" war
memorial named in the earlier National Memorial Act):
(e) REVERSIONARY CLAUSE.-The conveyance under subsection (a) shall be
subject to the condition that the recipient maintain the conveyed property as a
memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring
the American veterans of that war. If the Secretary determines that the conveyed
property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert
to the ownership of the United States.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat.
1054, 1100 (2003) (emphasis added).
85 The intensity of this fight is clear from the continued post-decision drama. First, the
cross was stolen, allegedly to protect the Court's decision, and VFW-sympathizers quickly
erected a replacement cross, also by cover of night. See Caroline Black, Mojave CrossHonoring
US. War Dead Stolen in Middle of the Night, CBSNEWS.COM, May 12, 2010, http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-504083 162-20004719-504083.html; Anonymous Letter Explaining Cross
Theft Sent to Desert Dispatch, DESERTDISPATCH.COM (May 11, 2010, 5:27 PM), http://www.
desertdispatch.com/articles/explaining-8465-anonymous-letter.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011);
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VFW complete freedom to replace the cross with a different kind of
WWI war memorial.
Whether the National Memorial designation itself violates the
Establishment Clause is a new and distinct issue. Only Justice
Stevens' dissent addressed its significance. He interpreted the Act as
a congressional declaration that the Mojave Cross is "the" World War
I National Memorial, thus granting the desert cross a status equivalent
to the National Mall's iconic symbols: the Washington Monument,
the Lincoln Memorial, and the Vietnam and WWII memorials.88 If
Justice Stevens' interpretation was accurate, if Congress has chosen

Mojave War Memorial Torn Down by Vandals!, LIBERTYINSTITUTE.ORG, http://www.liberty
institute.org/current-cases.php?category-6&article=67 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). NPS
responded by removing the cross as a violation of court orders-after refraining from doing just
that during the many years during the litigation. (The cross had been covered by a cardboard
box.) See Replica Cross Mysteriously Appears in Mojave: Authorities Call it Illegal and
Remove it from Federal Preserve, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 2010, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37261550; Park Service Removes Mojave Cross Replica,
CBN.cOM, May 21, 2010, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/May/Stolen-Mojave-DesertCross-Returned/. Since then, veterans and conservative Christian organizations have
campaigned loudly for the cross to be restored. See, e.g., LIBERTY INSTITUTE, PUT THE CROSS
BACK!, http://www.putthecrossback.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
9 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("Congress did not prevent the VFW from supplementing the existing monument or
replacing it with a war memorial of a different design."); id at 1826 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (stating that it is "merely speculative" to assert that the VFW will keep up the
cross because "[n]othing in the statutes compels the VFW (or any future proprietor) to keep it
up"); id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the land transfer statute "does not
categorically require the new owner of the property to display the existing memorial[,] ...
[although it] most certainly encourages this result"). Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
(joined only by Chief Justice Roberts) avoided addressing the issue, merely noted in passing, as
if an interesting fortuity, that "Congress ultimately designated the cross as a national memorial,
ranking it among those monuments honoring the noble sacrifices that constitute our national
heritage." Id. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
87 See id. at 1841-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Stevens's point was not to
evaluate the constitutionality of the designation per se, but rather to provide additional support
for his position that the land transfer to the VFW would be insufficient to cure the previously
adjudicated religious endorsement. Id. at 1837-38.
88Id. at 1841-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As far as I can tell, however, it is
unprecedented in the Nation's history to designate a bare, unadorned cross as the national war
memorial for a particular group of veterans. Neither the Korean War Memorial, the Vietnam
War Memorial, nor the World War II Memorial commemorates our veterans' sacrifice in
sectarian or predominantly religious ways. Each of these impressive structures pays equal
respect to all members of the Armed Forces who perished in the service of our Country in those
conflicts. In this case, by contrast, a sectarian symbol is the memorial. And because Congress
has establishedno other national monument to the veterans of the Great War, this solitarycross
in the middle of the desert is the national World War I memorial." (second emphasis added));
see also Brief of Respondent at 38, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) ("As a national
memorial, the cross is in a select group. There are only 45 other national memorials in the
United States, and the list features some of the nation's most significant and iconic symbols,
including the Washington Monument, the Jefferson Memorial, the Lincoln Memorial, the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the United States Marine Corps Memorial, the Flight 93
Memorial, and Mount Rushmore.").
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to honor only the Christian military sacrifice in WWI," then the
National Memorial designation would almost certainly violate the
Establishment Clause. Under that account, any reasonable observer
would conclude that the 2002 Act conveys a Christian bias, and that
Congress showed indifference to its harsh, exclusionary message.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MOJAVE CROSS WWI NATIONAL MEMORIAL
Compiling the National Memorial story from various facts in the
published decisions and media reports looks even worse. Not only
was it assumed that Congress intentionally chose a Christian cross as
the Nation's WWI symbol, but in the same 2002 Act, Congress
directed the federal government to pay for and install a new,
replacement cross monument. Also, unlike the three other legislative
actions supporting the Mojave Cross during the Buono litigation, this
Act's purpose was not directed at saving the cross from imminent
removal. That this new honor was both superfluous to the
preservation goal, and granted in the face of an Establishment Clause
lawsuit, suggests disregard for the appearance of religious
endorsement. Moreover, this same cross war memorial had earlier
failed to qualify for the National Registry of Historic Places, whichin contrast to the National Memorial honor-is governed by objective
standards and expert selection. 90 Proclaiming a new National
Memorial, a designation shared by iconic symbols, appears to be a
fundamental tool for creating, and publicly affirming, the national
identity. As a result, its timing, immediately post-9/1 1, could raise
suspicions that its intended message was to declare to the world that
the United States is a Christian Nation.
The research presented in this Section IV, however, constructs a
strikingly different, more ambiguous narrative. On the whole, the new
information either rebuts or shows no foundation for the charges

8 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1842 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government's interest in
honoring all those who have rendered heroic public service regardless of creed, as well as its
constitutional responsibility to avoid endorsement of a particular religious view, should control
wherever national memorials speak on behalf of our entire country." (emphasis added)); see
also Brief of Respondent at 40, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) ("Because the cross is
sectarian and specifies the divinity of Christ ... [rlegardless of who owns the land on which the
cross sits, its continuing designation as a national memorial excludes the contribution and
sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of non-Christian World War I veterans and their families.");
Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations
andExpedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211 (2011).
9 See infra Section IV.B.3.
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above, although it does identify some new issues which could be used
to build the case for an invalid preference.
Because one goal of this Symposium Article is to explore the
difference, if any, that would be made by the combination of an
Establishment Clause and a Free Speech claim with a "government
speech defense," this Section IV will start by presenting the baseline
inquiry. Does the 2002 National Memorial designation, standing
alone, violate the Establishment Clause? Then, Section V will address
the ultimate question of how the new government speech doctrine
might affect this analysis.
This Section is structured around the Lemon/endorsement test, 91
which continues to be the primary approach used by courts in
symbolic speech cases. 9 2 It begins by examining the traditional
indicators for determining whether a statute had a "secular purpose,"
and then presents most of the research findings as the contextual
details used to assess "primary effect" and the appearance of
governmental endorsement of religion.
A. Secular or Religious Purpose?
Under McCreary County, the Supreme Court's most recent case
decided on "purpose" grounds, legislative purpose is viewed through
the eyes of an "'objective observer,' one who takes account of the
traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute."' 9 3 Writing for the slim majority,
Justice Souter counseled: "although a legislature's stated reasons will
generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be
genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious
objective."
The text of the 2002 National Memorial Act states that Congress's
purpose is to "commemorat[e] United States participation in World
91 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (as modified by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (folding original three prong, excessive entanglement, into second prong); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying the Lemon test by asking
how purpose and effect would appear to a reasonable observer).
9 See, e.g., ACLU v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) ("As reformulated in
recent years, the second prong of Lemon asks whether 'the government action has the purpose
or effect of endorsing religion."' (quoting ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 635 (6th Cir.
2005))); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, No. 08-4061, 2010 WL 5151630, at *16-17 (10th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2010) (applying the reformulated second prong of Lemon that asks "whether [the]
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion" (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))). Both cases are recent
examples of Circuit Courts applying the Lemon/endorsement inquiry.
9 McCreary Ctny. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
9 Id. at 864.

HeinOnline -- 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1191 2010-2011

1192

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

War I and honor[] the American veterans of that war."95 While the
Act's stated purpose is secular, it surely is debatable whether the
commemorative symbol chosen transforms that purpose into a
primarily sectarian one. The Act's express reference to the cross's
provenance, however, performs multiple secularizing functions. The
text expresses that the memorial was erected by a private, secular
group, the VFW; also, the year of origin conveys its members' likely
status as WWI veterans and the memorial's almost 70 years of
history. Finally, the Act's stated plan, to restore the explanatory
plaque and provide a more historically accurate replica, suggests
Congress's intent to emphasize that war memorial history and correct
the misimpression that it is merely a Christian cross displayed on
federal land.
Next, the Act has no legislative history at all. Indeed, the
circumstances surrounding its passage suggest that few in Congress
were even specifically aware of voting for it. The Mojave Cross
National Memorial designation was but a few lines in an annual
Defense Department appropriations bill. And this bill was
exceptionally large based on its historic timing in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11.96 This January 2002 Defense Department
behemoth also included three appropriations for the preservation of
existing war memorials, and those (secular) grants were each in the
$2-4 million range.97
Nor did a fairly exhaustive search for any press releases or news
coverage of the Act uncover any public statements suggesting that its
legislative sponsor, Representative Jerry Lewis, had a religious
motive. Rather, all such statements expressed only the intent to help
preserve the Mojave Cross on Sunrise Rock, and focused repeatedly

95 Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278-79 (2002). Section 8137(a) reads in
full:
DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL MEMORIAL.-The five-foot-tall white cross first erected
by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States in 1934 . .. now located within
the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve ... is hereby designated as a national
memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring
the American veterans of that war.

Id.
96See Helen Dewar, $4 Billion Shiftedfor Security, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A6-7
("[T]he Pentagon ... received a $42 billion increase, the largest one-year increase in more than
two decades, according to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd (DW.Va.).").
9 Pub. L. No. 107-117 §§ 8136(a), 8138-1839, 115 Stat. at 2278-79 (granting
$2,100,000 for restoration of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, a WWI memorial in Marnes
La-Coguette, France; $4,200,000 for the preservation of the former U.S.S. ALABAMA as a
memorial; and $4,250,000 for the preservation of U.S.S. INTREPID as a memorial).
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on the need to support veterans and respect military sacrifice. There
is no evidence to analogize this situation to the few cases where the
Court has found an Establishment Clause violation based on
legislators' manifest religious purpose. 99
Also troubling, though not relevant to show Congress's purpose in
January 2002, is that Congress took similar action in 2004, when it
designated the Mount Soledad Memorial in San Diego a "National
Memorial." The Mount Soledad cross memorial has been litigated for
decades; recently, the Ninth Circuit held its display on federal land
unconstitutional.100 While its National Memorial designation also was
not at issue in the Mount Soledad litigation, there were legislators'
statements to review. The court interpreted their stated desire to
preserve the cross as reflecting only their intent to respect the
9 See, e.g., Rene Sanchez, Cross Creates Desert Storm: ACLU, Park Service Debate
Makeshift War Memorial, NAT'L ASS'N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, Dec. 9,
2002, http://www.nathpo.org/News/SacredSites/News-SacredSites35.htm ("'Preserving the
cross is only about preserving a part of history in the desert,' said Jim Specht, a spokesman for
Lewis. 'Residents out there have a very strong attachment to it as a war memorial, not as a
religious symbol. People come from all over the desert to use it as a gathering point."'); Lewis
Advances Resolution Urging Return of Mojave Cross, VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS, Sept. 28,
2010, http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/resolution-22043-advances-retum.htm ("It is time
to give our veterans groups the ability to replace this important memorial to those who gave
their lives to defend our nation and freedoms." (quoting Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA))); Congress
Condemns Theft of Mojave Cross Memorial, CHRISTIAN EXAMMNER, Oct., 2010, http://www.
our
("'Supporting
christianexaminer.com/Articles/Articles%200ctIO/ArtOct0_09.html
veterans is one of the top priorities for members of Congress, and I am grateful that my
colleagues took this important measure up before we went out of session,' said Lewis.
'Congress has repeatedly voted overwhelmingly to protect the Mojave Cross as a memorial to
veterans and those who have died to defend our nation, and it is vital that we continue that
support."' (quoting Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA))).
9 The Court has relied on the "purpose" prong only a handful of times. See McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (religious purpose in posting Ten Commandments
in courthouses); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (where a school's
policy, amended in response to litigation challenging long history of student-led prayer at high
school football games, specified that one purpose of the student's address was to "solemnize"
the event, and suggested an "invocation"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching
intelligent design in biology class); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (statute's sponsor
proclaimed his religious purpose for Alabama's "moment of silence" law); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (where a school posted the Ten Commandments in every
classroom).
100
See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that memorial
cross on federal land violated Establishment Clause). The Ninth Circuit opinion sets forth the
entire, multiple-case history, which stretched out over two decades. Id. at 1103-04. Following
federal court's declaration that the cross display on city land violated the California
Constitution, and later holdings that various efforts to save the cross memorial also were
unconstitutional, Congress passed a law designating the Mount Soledad cross a National
Memorial and authorizing the federal government to take ownership. Id. at 1104 (citing
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 116, 118 Stat. 2809, 3346-47
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note)). Here, too, the honorary label appears extraneous; although
for Mount Soledad, it arguably may have been necessary to establish a public purpose for
eminent domain.
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military, which it found a sufficiently "secular purpose."o' In sum,
while it is always an elusive quest to find a viable "legislative"
intent, 102 there is insufficient evidence to show that the Mojave Cross
National Memorial Act's express, secular goal is a "sham" or "merely
secondary to a religious objective."'o
While the Act's timing may cause speculation as to motive, that
alone likely is insufficient to show a religious purpose. As Justice
Souter observed in McCreary, "A secret motive stirs up no strife and
does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents. . . ."'0 It is
undeniable that Representative Lewis introduced the Act as part of his
response to Frank Buono's pending Establishment Clause lawsuit
over the Mojave Cross; the Act was one of four bills he sponsored
during his campaign to keep the cross war memorial at its original
location. os In addition, while to some, passage after 9/11 is consistent
with the nation's surge in patriotism, to others, that time period was
infected with jingoism, often combined with religious fervor.

101
In Trunk v. City of San Diego, when analyzing the legislative purpose of the statute by
which the federal government acquired a long-litigated cross war memorial, the Ninth Circuit
initially stated that it found a secular purpose because the statute was directed at preserving the
"war memorial" and did not specifically mention the cross. Id. at 1108. But even assuming the
statute was ambiguous, the court found a predominantly secular purpose based on legislators'
statements on the floor, described above, which the court interpreted as expounding a secular,
and not a religious, purpose. Id. at 1108-09. Perhaps because it was not at issue, the court made
no mention of the suspicious timing of the Mount Soledad National Memorial designation,
which also occurred during extended Establishment Clause litigation.
02For summaries of the critiques of the "secular purpose" requirement, and proposed
amendments to the versions in various precedent, see, for example, Josh Blackman, This Lemon
Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute's Secular Purpose, 20 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351 (2010) (arguing for statutory, over legislative, purpose, and rejecting of
McCreary's objective observer in favor of original public meaning); Andrew Koppelman,
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87, 88 (2002) (arguing that the secular purpose requirement
should allow government to favor religion generally, so long as it does not violate the axiom
against declaring religious truth).
1o3 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864; see also Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1118-22 (Ninth Circuit limited
its "purpose" inquiry to the text and legislative history of the statute at issue there, and analyzed
most facts as part of its broader "effects" inquiry, including facts showing that (unlike the
Mojave Cross) Mount Soledad was created as a Christian monument, and only later, in response
to litigation, acquired its current identity as a war memorial).
" McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863. Justice Souter further explains, "If someone in the
government hides religious motive so well that the 'objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute,' cannot see it, then without something
more the government does not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking
religious sides." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308).
105
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106-554, § 133 app. D, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-230 (2000); see also Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 107-248,
§ 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002) ("None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used
to dismantle national memorials commemorating United States participation in World War I.").
The other two were the National Memorial designation act under discussion, and the Land
Transfer Act. See supra Section m.
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B. Appearance ofReligious Endorsement?
In assessing an act's "primary effect," the endorsement test
employs the device of the "reasonable observer." As the attributes of
this "hypothetical construct" change over time-increasing in
knowledge, and decreasing in sensitivity--criticism of the test has
expanded.'0 6 Still, it remains more sensitive to the impact on viewers,
and to changing social contexts, than the backward-looking
"tradition" approach. Moreover, it survived Salazar v. Buono.107 The
Court's most recent expression of the test, Justice Kennedy's
statement in Buono, is the most expansive yet: "That test requires the
hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its
placement." 08
Some of the research on National Memorials presented below is
not widely known, but all of it is publicly available. A "reasonable
observer" challenging such a designation could be deemed aware of
these background facts and laws, especially under the Buono
formulation (one "who knows all" pertinent facts). 09 Thus, this
Article presents all the relevant information on National Memorials,
including history that some courts might decide is a bit too obscure
for attribution to the endorsement test's hypothetical informed
observer.
1. The Nation's Other WWI Memorials
By far the most significant discovery is that the U.S. already
commemorates World War I with several more impressive, and
secular, national memorials. Surprisingly, over the past several
1o6See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 105
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 72, 81 (2010) ("[W]ithout a reasonable observer who can discern a
message of exclusion the endorsement test loses much of its content."). Another main critique of
the endorsement test is that in practice, its "reasonable observer" is the judge's usually
majoritarian view, and thus inadequately fails its ostensible goal to protect non-adherents. See
B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REv. 491, 521 (2005) ("[B]ecause the social context that
produces meaning reflects the power structure of the larger society ... the meaning discerned
from [religious] displays will contain a majoritarian bias."). See Dolan, Endorsement and
History, supra note 26, at 46-47 (for description of test's evolution).
107 See Dolan, Endorsement and History,supra note 26, at 51-57.
10
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819-20 (2010).
109
My own normative position is two-fold. First, the "reasonable observer" should be
considered a reasonably informed member of the community that is likely to be viewing the
challenged display (or, as here, to become aware of the challenged government act). And
second, where a government's actions create the misimpression that it is endorsing religion, it
has an affirmative obligation to explain its plausible secular reasons to the immediate audience.
See Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 6, at 63 (discussing this position).
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years-the very same time period in which Buono was before the
Supreme Court-two have been competing to be the official WWI
National Memorial. If the Mojave Cross does not enjoy a singular
position, but instead is only one of numerous WWI tributes that are
given special recognition by the federal government, then the charge
of religious favoritism evaporates.
To start, in 2004, Congress passed a bill recognizing the Liberty
Memorial Museum in Kansas City, Missouri as "America's National
World War I Museum."' 10 The Museum is located on the grounds of
the "Liberty Memorial," an iconic white tower with clear national
historical significance."' The site dedication in 1921 marks "the only
time in history" that all five "supreme Allied Commanders ... were
together in one place."ll 2 And when the Liberty Memorial was
completed, "President Calvin Coolidge delivered the dedication
speech to a crowd of 150,000 people." 13
Then, in April 2009, the House passed a bill requesting that the
Liberty Memorial monument be designated as the National World
War I Memorial. In sharp contrast to the assumptions in the Buono
case, the bill states: "There is no nationally recognized memorial
honoring the service of Americans who served in World War I"l 14
Also, earlier in 2009, a competing bill was introduced, requesting that
a District of Columbia World War I Memorial, which already is
located on the National Mall, be re-designated as "The National and
District of Columbia World War I Memorial."' 15
While the 111 ' Congress did not reach closure on which of these
two monuments is the most fitting national WWI tribute, in March,
2011, a compromise bill was introduced, proposing to make both of
o10
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 1031, 118 Stat. 1811, 1820 (2004). Interestingly, while the government noted in
passing, "America's National World War I Museum," Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17, Salazar
v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), it did so only as one item on a list of National
Memorials located on private land.
"I For a brief history and a photo of the Memorial itself, see Jason Roe, Monumental
Undertaking, The Kansas City Public Library (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.kclibrary.org/
?q=blog/month-kansas-city-history/monumental-undertaking.
112Mission and History, NAT'L WORLD WAR I MUSEUM AT LIBERTY MEM'L, http://www.
(last visited Mar. 31,
theworldwar.org/s/110/new/index.aspx?sid=110&gid=l&pgid=l114
2011).
1

4World War I Memorial and Centennial Act of 2009, H.R. 1849, 111th Cong. § 2, f 13
(2009) (emphasis added).
us Frank Buckles World War I Memorial Act, H.R. 482, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing
that the monument be repaired, and for the addition of a supplemental element or sculpture to
signify its proposed new national status). Frank Buckles was the last surviving American WWI
veteran. Until his recent death, Mr. Buckles was involved in this campaign for National
Memorial designation. Richard Goldstein, Frank Buckles, Last American World War I
Doughboy Dead at 110, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at B16.
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them "National Memorials," and to create a new "World War I
Centennial Commission" to spearhead Centennial ceremonies. The
bill also proposes that this Commission would establish a new
commemorative work on the National Mall, on the site of the existing
D.C. Memorial, and supplementing it to convey its proposed new
National Memorial status."' 6 While one could argue that the Mojave
Cross currently still stands alone as the only WWI "National
Memorial," that stark picture is erased by reading the debates over the
dueling candidates for that honor.
From a December 2009 hearing on the competing bills, it appears
that neither the federal government, nor the public, is generally aware
of the claim that the Mojave Cross was named by Congress to
represent all who fought in WWI on behalf of the United States." 7
Also at that proceeding, a National Park Service (NPS) representative
testified against both new bills because: "There has not been any
study authorized or conducted to determine which of the various
World War I Memorials in the United States would be best suited to
be named as the single or official National World War I
Memorial.""'8 She explained that WWI veterans already are honored
at the General John J. Pershing Park, "a national World War I
Memorial on Pennsylvania Avenue," as well as on the Mall near the
White House, by the ISt Division and 2 nd Division Memorials." 9
The sense conveyed is that the choice of the "official" WWI
National Memorial is a significant decision with major fiscal and
symbolic import; in contrast, the 2002 Act designating the Mojave
Cross a National Memorial passed by unnoticed, just a bit player in
the long Buono litigation saga.
11

6 H.R. 938, 112th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2011).
1"See also Tony Dokoupil, The War We Forgot-World War I Has No National
Monument, No Iconic Images, And Only One Soldier Still Alive, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18,
2008, at 50 (describing WWI as publicly ignored, compared to other U.S. wars;
hypothesizing on the "seeming lack of interest," the article suggests that one reason may
be the lack of records: "WWI was the last war fought without modem methods of bearing
witness").
118Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks of the Comm. on Energy and Nat'1 Res.,
Concerning S. 2097, to Authorize the Rededication of the D.C. War Mem'1 as a Nat'l and D.C.
World War I Mem'1 to Honor the Sacrifices Made by American Veterans of World War I, 111th
Cong. (Dec. 3, 2009), availableat http://www.doi.gov/ocl/2006/S2097_120309.htm (statement
of Katherine H. Stevenson, Assistant Director, Business Services, National Park Service, U.S.
Department of the Interior) (emphasis added).

19Id; see also American Expeditionary Forces Memorial, AMERICAN BATTLE
MONUMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.abmc.gov/memorials/memorials/pe.php (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011) (honoring General Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces); First
Division Monument, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/whho/historyculture/firstdivision-monument.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). These monuments, however, are not on the
official list of "National Memorials." See supranote 122.
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2. The Unusual Transfer of the Cross National Memorial
A second point that is significant here, but which was not
discussed in the Buono litigation,120 is Congress's past practice of
simultaneously "abolishing" the closely related "National Monument"
statusl21 when the government transferred previously designated
National Monument land to another entity. 122 Congress similarly has
the power to abolish any of the "National Memorials" it has
designated.12 3 One reason Congress has abolished monuments in the
120Discussion of the land transfer terms in the Buono litigation and commentary focused
on: (i) whether the remedy was invalid because the government failed to solicit other potential
purchasers for the parcel; and (ii) whether the National Memorial designation meant the
government would continue to control the property post-transfer. See, e.g., Brief of PlaintiffAppellee at 26-37, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 05-55852) (arguing that
the land was transferred "in a manner whose purpose and effect is to keep the cross standing,
and the cross's continuing designation as a national memorial ... reaffirm[ed] the government's
continuing endorsement of a sectarian religious symbol"); Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono
and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 64-66 (2010)
("The land transfer demonstrated favoritism toward the cross.").
121 "National Monument[s]" are defined as "landmarks, structures, and other objects of
historic or scientific interest," which are located on government land, while "National
Memorial[s]" are defined as "commemorative of a historic person or episode." Designation of
NationalPark System Units, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
In reviewing the law and examples of each, however, the two categories appear to be
indistinguishable for purposes of the issues raised in Salazar v. Buono. The annotations to the
Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §431 (2006), which gave the President authority to declare a
"National Monument," provides a comprehensive list of all national monuments established by
the President, all national monuments established by Congress, and all national memorials
established by Congress. Id.
The most significant difference appears to be this separation of powers issue. While both
Congress and the President have the power to declare a "National Monument," only Congress
has authority to designate a "National Memorial." Congress has this power through its
constitutional authority, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the "Property Clause"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8, cl. 18 (the "Necessary and Proper Clause"), while the President relies on the
Antiquities Act §431, which grants him authority to declare national monuments and to reserve
a part of federal land for that purpose. In an interesting historical footnote, presidents often have
used this power as a means of land preservation, particularly in the West. See Christine A.
Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
1333 (2002) (discussing this extensive, originally unexpected use of the Antiquities Act); Lin,
supra note 70, at 709-19 (analyzing use of presidential declarations to preserve open lands in
Western states against political opposition, especially President Clinton's unusual designation of
22 such "monuments").
122
See Antiquities Act 1906-2006: About the Antiquities Act, NAT'L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/abolished.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011)
(listing eleven "abolished" national monuments).
123It is well-established that "Congress itself possesses, and has exercised, power to
change the status of national monuments." Transfer of Nat'l Monuments to Nat'l Park Serv. in
the Dep't of the Interior, 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 75, 79 (1929) (advising that only Congress has
authority to transfer national monument from War Dept. to National Park Service); Proposed
Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat'l Monument, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185 (1938) (advising that
the President lacks the authority to abolish national monuments, even if he originally designated
them). Based on the similarities between national monuments and memorials, Congress's broad
powers over the use and disposal of federal property, its exclusive authority to designate
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past is where the monument is later determined to be "of less than
national significance."' 2 4 Typically, in those circumstances, Congress
would pass one bill that both transferred the land from NPS to a state
or local government, and abolished its existing "National Monument"

designation.12 5
The most relevant example is the "Father Millet Cross National
Monument," which also involved a lone cross on a small patch of
land. A large bronze cross inscribed with Latin words glorifying
Christ,12 6 at one-eighth acre, it was once known as "America's
Smallest National Monument." It commemorates a French missionary
priest who, on Good Friday in 1688, blessed the first wooden cross
erected on that spot to give thanks for the twelve living survivors, and
to pray for the eighty-eight soldiers who died of starvation manning
Old Fort Niagara. It was declared a "National Monument" by
presidential proclamation in 1925, and a Catholic organization, the
Knights of Columbus, donated the bronze upgrade in 1926.127 But in
1949, after determining that this monument was of "questionable
national significance," Congress passed a bill authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to convey the land and monument to the
State of New York and abolishing the cross's "national monument"
status.128
Moreover, reviewing the typical terms of transfer reveals
additional irregularities with the Mojave Cross land transfer, which

National Memorials, and exclusive power to abolish National Monuments, it appears
unassailable to conclude that Congress also has power to abolish, or otherwise alter the status of,
National Memorials.
24
t See About the Antiquities Act, supra note 122 (providing information about abolished
national monuments).
125Id
126Specifically, the cross is 18 feet high and 8 feet wide, and bears the inscription "REGN.
VINC. IMP. CHRS." These abbreviations stand for, "Regnat, Vinci, Imperat, Christus," which is
translated as "Christ reigns, conquers, rules." Thor Borresen, Father Millet Cross: America's
Smallest National Monument, III THE REGIONAL REVIEw, no.1, July 1939, available at
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online-books/regional-review/vol3-la.htm.
127Id. at 2; see also Bob Janiskee, Pruning the Parks: Father Millet Cross National
Monument, 1925-1949, Was the Smallest National Monument Ever Established,NAT'L PARKS
TRAVELER (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2009/09/pruning-parksfather-millet-cross-national-monument-1925-1949-was-smallest-national-monument-everes4482 (describing the monument and the history behind it).
128H.R. 4073, Pub. L. 81-292, 63 Stat. 691 (Sept. 7, 1949) ("The national monument, upon
conveyance of such property to the State of New York, is abolished."). The bill further stated
that the transfer was "without consideration, for public use as a part of the Fort Niagara State
Park, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary may deem advisable[.]" Id. The NPS
website, in its narrative, "About the 'Abolished' National Monuments," states that this was done
due to "questionable national significance and limited federal development," and that the Fr.
Millet cross monument is now part of Fort Niagara State Park. About the Antiquities Act, supra
note 122.
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are relevant here. First, where these abolished National Monuments
have consisted of physical structures, rather than unique land features,
none of these land transfer acts contained a reversionary clause that
required continuing to maintain the monument.12 9 What these acts did
tend to include, however, was a reversionary clause requiring that the
land be kept open for public use.130 Given Sunrise Rock's beauty, its
current location in the Mojave Desert Preserve, and its now-private
owner, transferring the land to the VFW without an express public
use requirement is an additional sign of untoward favoritism.
There are two more missed opportunities that also exacerbate the
appearance of endorsement of religion from the Cross's continued
National Memorial status. Given the long local history of Easter
services at the Mojave Cross, one would expect a "religious use"
restriction to appear as a condition of the transfer. And recall the
National Memorial Act's requirement that the Secretary of the
Interior install a replica cross and plaque to identity the site as a
longstanding historic war memorial. Section IV.B.4. explains why
federal funding of the cross is unconstitutional. But while pretransfer, this requirement could have been used as evidence of a
secular purpose, now any remaining federal obligation has the
opposite effect. One would expect the land transfer act to require the
VFW to acquire and install a replica cross and sign, if it chose to keep
the original memorial, or to erect a replacement WWI memorial
within a set time period of its removal.
In sum, for anyone aware of Congress' past practices, the fact that
the Mojave Cross National Memorial status was not abolished in the
land transfer act, and that the VFW is required to maintain a WWI
memorial on the site, but is not also required to keep the site open for
public use, refrain from religious worship use, or even pay for the
replica and sign that are so essential to conveying a secular, historical
message to viewers-all combine to suggest government endorsement
of religion. The closer question is whether this history is too obscure
to matter. The most recent act abolishing a National Monument was
129As mentioned, it appears that these transfers were to other governmental entities; given
the Mount Soledad case law construing the California Constitution, doing that was not an option
for the Mojave Cross. See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the display of Mount Soledad, a large cross war memorial, on City property
violated the California Constitution's "No Preference Clause").
" 0 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 84-1785 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3708, 3710
(Verendrye National Monument's bill provided: "That the Verendrye National Monument,
North Dakota, is hereby abolished, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to convey the
lands ... to the State of North Dakota for public recreation use and as a State historic site," and
"the title and right to possession .. . shall revert to the United States upon a finding ... that the
grantee has not complied with the terms of the conveyance .... .").
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in 1980, but information about these acts is fairly easy to obtain
online.' 3 1The Mojave Cross's unusual transfer terms, however, would
be known to anyone who has closely followed the Buono litigation or
read the judicial opinions.
3. Unqualifiedas a NationalHistoricLandmark
After the controversy surfaced, in 1999, a NPS historian was asked
to evaluate the Mojave Cross for a far more common honor,
placement on the "National Register of Historic Places."' 3 2 He found
it unqualified. Given that government literature calls the National
Register "the official list of the Nation's historic places worthy of
preservation," 33 this also suggests that the cross was made a National
Memorial more because it is a Christian symbol with strong
constituent support, than based on its historical importance and
national significance.
But upon investigation, the grounds for this rejection do not
necessarily undermine the validity of its National Memorial
designation. To qualify as a National Historic Landmark,
knowledgeable professionals must find that the property possesses
both "exceptional value" in showing the Nation's heritage, and
"integrity," a term that refers to consistency with its original
appearance. 3 4 Because the physical object of the cross war memorial
had been replaced several times, and because its original

31

NPS lists eleven National Monuments that have been abolished, with the first occurring
in 1930 and the most recent in 1980, which is approximately two decades prior to when the
Mojave Cross controversy began. Antiquities Act 1906-2006: Monuments List, NAT'L PARK
SERV., http://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2011). That list, however, is on the federal government's own website, and the primary web
page is titled, "About the Antiquities Act," which is one of the first stops in looking at the
Memorial issue. See About the Antiquities Act, supra note 122.
National
32
1 See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV).
133 See National Register of Historic Places Program: About Us, NAT'L REGISTER OF
HISTORIC PLACES, http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
'- 36 C.F.R. § 65.4(a) (2009) (emphasis added) (NPS regulations set the criteria for
evaluating and designating property as a "National Historic Landmark."). Primarily, properties
are required to be "nationally significant," as determined through evaluations by "professionals,
including historians, architectural historians, archeologists and anthropologists familiar with the
broad range of the nation's resources and historical themes." Id. § 65.4. Subsection (a) further
specifies that such landmarks must "possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or
interpreting the heritage of the United States in history" or other areas, and "possess a high
degree of integrity of location, design ... materials, [and] workmanship ..... Id. § 65.4(a); see
also National Register of Historic Places: Fundamentals, NAT'L REGISTER OF HISTORIC
PLACES, http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/national-register-fundamentals.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2011) (explaining "integrity" as whether the property "still look[s] much the way it did in
the past").
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commemorative plaque was missing, it lacked the necessary
"integrity" to qualify-even given sufficient historical value. 35
The second reason provided for the 1999 rejection is based on
federal preservation laws, which have since changed. Most years,
there has been an Easter service held outdoors on Sunrise Rock, and
federal land-marking regulations at that time excluded sites that were
"used for religious purposes." 3 6 Federal regulations are now quite
flexible: 3 7 active houses of worship are on the National Registry and
have even received federal preservation grants. 3 8
4. Using Government Funds to Purchasea Cross
Turning to the 2002 Act's requirement that the Secretary of the
Interior use federal funds to "acquire and install" a large wooden
cross on Sunrise Rock, it presents an unmistakable Establishment
Clause problem. The Act is salvageable, though, because this
provision is both severable and unnecessary. Still, demonstrating this
constitutional flaw is useful in evaluating the Act's overall "primary
effect."
While many funding restrictions on religious organizations have
loosened, Supreme Court precedent still requires it to be done as part
of a broad, religion-neutral program, and still prohibits spending
government funds for a "religious use." 39 Also, the Court has been
particularly strict in evaluating Establishment Clause claims involving
improvements to real property, which appreciates over time.140
'35 Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
'36 d. at 769 (stating that the second reason NPS denied landmark status to the Mojave
Cross is that "the site [was] used for religious purposes as well as commemoration").
37
' See 36 C.F.R. § 65.4(b) (2009) ('Ordinarily ... properties . . . used for religious
purposes ... are not eligible for designation. Such properties, however, will qualify if they fall
within the following categories: (1) A religious property deriving its primary national
significance from architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance. . . ."). For a
discussion of increased tolerance for public funding of the preservation of religious properties,
see infra Part V.B.4.
138
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Park Serv., Old North Foundation Awarded $317,000
Grant Under Save America's Treasures Program, (May 27, 2003), http://home.nps.gov/news/
release.htm?id=395.
139
The governing case is Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a public
program of lending computers and other instructional equipment to a broad range of schools,
including parochial schools), where Justice O'Connor's controlling concurrence approved this
divertible form of aid, based on the program's "secular use" requirement, but maintained that it
is still unconstitutional to divert public aid to a religious use. Id. at 838-41 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
1oln the principle case, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court allowed
federal construction grants to church-affiliated universities as part of a broad-based secular
program, but held that a 20-year restriction on religious use of the publicly financed buildings
was inadequate because at that time, the building would retain full value. See also Comm. for
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down a program of
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The 2002 Act presents an atypical case: the VFW is a secular
entity, and the only religious "use" of its war memorial is the
religious service held there one morning a year. But any use of tax
funds to purchase and erect a large Christian cross raises a bright red
flag. That holds true even if Congress required the replica solely to
mitigate the Mojave Cross's religious appearance by emphasizing the
war memorial's historicity. The Sixth Circuit made this point
recently, while stretching to allow churches to participate in a
downtown beautification program. It distinguished permissible
repairs, those exterior portions of churches that "lack any content at
all," from the unconstitutional use of public funds to purchase or
improve anything that "itself has an inherently religious content"such as paying for a cross.141
Indeed, the National Memorial Act's $10,000 grant does not
comply with even the current, permissive historic-preservation policy.
That policy is based on a 2003 legal opinion from the Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 14 2 which itself relied on features of
the "Save America's Treasures" Program that were absent in the

grants for maintenance and repair of parochial schools). The Court has never repudiated either
this aspect of Nyquist or its decision in Tilton.
141Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 292 (6th Cir.
2009) ("[A] program may have the primary effect of advancing religion if the benefit itselfhas
an inherently religious content. Governments may not dole out crosses or Torahs to their
citizens, even if they give them to all citizens, without running into an Establishment Clause
problem. Yet no such aid was distributed here. In the first place, the govemment gave monetary
grants, not religious symbols, to participating entities. In the second place ... the vast majority
of the reimbursed repairs-the renovation of exterior lights, pieces of masonry and brickwork,
outdoor planters, exterior doors, concrete ramps, entrance ways, overhangs, building trims,
gutters, fencing, curbs, shrubbery and irrigation systems-lack any content at all, much less a
religious content. The thrust of the program goes to facade, not to substance, to giving the
exterior of the buildings a clean, up-to-date appearance." (first emphasis added) (citations
omitted)); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic PreservationGrants to Houses of
Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002)
(suggesting that the public aid should be allowed to restore the exteriors of historic houses of
worship, but prohibited for the interiors, which have religious content).
42
1 See Authority of the Dep't of the Interior to Provide Historic Pres. Grants to Historic
Religious Props. such as the Old North Church, Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/OldNorthChurch.htm [hereinafter 2003 OLC Opinion]. This was an
about-face from an earlier opinion, Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Pres. Grants to
Religious Prop., 19 Op. O.L.C. 267 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 OLC Opinion], which found this
type of grant unconstitutional based on the pervasively sectarian nature of the church recipients
and Tilton v. Richardson. This is not to say there will not continue to be legal challenges to
specific cases.
Moreover, the 2003 OLC Opinion itself seems to have overstepped. It relied on the
Mitchell plurality, where Justice Thomas, joined by only three members of the Court, opined
that paying money directly to religious schools for use in religion class would be acceptable, so
long as the program itself was available to schools on a neutral basis. 2003 OLC Opinion, supra,
at II.B. For a discussion of its additional constitutional flaws, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, FederalismandFaith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 22-25 (2006).
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Mojave Cross designation. Specifically, these historic preservation
grants are available to a broad array of mostly secular beneficiaries,
and are awarded pursuant to a formal, neutral application process.14 3
Moreover, the grant award process uses both subject matter experts
and pre-established, relatively objective criteria.'" Also, those grants
included a 50-year deed restriction requiring owners to preserve the
historical features, and a 50-year public use requirement.14 5 In sum, if
a court did apply the historic preservation analogy here, the funding
provision of the Mojave Cross National Memorial Act would not
survive.
C. The Baseline Establishment Clause Claim
It is inherently difficult to draw any reliable conclusions as to the
constitutionality of the Mojave Cross National Memorial designation.
Not only are outcomes generally unpredictable given the
Establishment Clause's context-specific tests, but many facts are still
in flux. As shown in Section IV.A., however, the Act is unlikely to
fail the "secular purpose" test. 146 The questions posed by the National
Registry of Historic Places issue, and the federal funding of a replica
cross also have been accounted for.147 This Section evaluates whether
labeling this cross as a National Memorial conveys government
endorsement of Christianity. Extrapolating some reasonable
assumptions from the status quo, it appears that this particular
honorary designation would have a fair chance of passing the
endorsement test.

1432003 OLC Opinion, supra note 142, at I.B; see also Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of
Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 292 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding property tax
reimbursement grants given to several downtown churches by city development authority for
renovations to building exteriors for purpose of improving streetscape appearance, stating: "No
reasonable, reasonably informed observer, moreover, would infer from the churches'
participation in this program, alongside and on equal terms with dozens of secular entities, that
the agency endorsed or approved of the churches' religious views. The program's breadth,
evenhandedness and eminently secular objectives help to break the link between the government
and religious indoctrination." (citations omitted)).
1442003 OLC Opinion, supra note 142, at I.C (citing FY 2002 FederalSave America's
Treasures Grants-Guidelinesand Application Instructions,PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE ARTS
& THE HlUMANrIEs (2002), http://www.pcah.gov/sat/SAT2002.html).
145 Id. at H.E.
146See supra Section IV.A (showing secular purpose in text, and lack of legislative history
or sponsor's statements to suggest otherwise).
47
1 See supra Section IV.B.3 (Mojave Cross not qualified based on lack of physical

"integrity" due to replacement of original cross and superseded "religious use" restriction, so
failure to qualify does not indicate lack of historic value); Section IV.B.4 (concluding that
public funding of large cross remains unconstitutional, but that the funding portion of the Act is
severable).
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The essential factor is that the "reasonable observer" must be
deemed aware of the other WWI national memorials, their current
competition for supremacy, and the general ignorance of the Mojave
Cross designation. This may in fact be reasonable, given WWI's
approaching Centennial, and the correspondingly enhanced
congressional and public interest in its commemoration. And unlike a
local viewer of the Mojave Cross itself, a plaintiff challenging its
National Memorial designation presumably would be interested in,
and knowledgeable about, this backdrop.
Next, the Mojave Cross currently is missing from Sunrise Rock,
and the VFW is eager to replace it. It also seems safe to assume that
the VFW is likely to post a replacement plaque, in order to
acknowledge their original 1934 installation and war memorial
purpose. In addition, although the Land Transfer Act does not itself
contain appropriate restrictions, assume further that the VFW will
continue the preexisting use patterns. If so, the land will stay open to
the public, and will be used for religious services only once a year, for
an Easter sunrise service.
Weighing against constitutionality is the appearance of bias:
Congress now has designated as National Memorials not one, but two
Christian crosses, both in the midst of high-profile, controversial
Establishment Clause lawsuits. Particularly egregious, in neither
Buono nor the Mount Soledad litigation was the honorary designation
necessary to save the longstanding war memorial from destruction or
removal. Also troublesome is Congress's failure to abolish the
Mojave Cross's superfluous honor once it settled on land transfer as
the solution. The Court has recognized that government acts taken to
preserve an historic war memorial will be viewed more favorably by
the "reasonable observer," as compared to government acts to create
new sectarian symbols, especially given today's vastly different, more
14 8
pluralistic, divisive social culture.
Another concern is that the unique circumstances of this type of
"speech" renders it more difficult to explain to "viewers" of National
Memorials why a Christian cross was given this honor. Posting an
explanatory sign at the location of a monument is a relatively simple
matter. Here, NPS can, and should, include a context-providing
disclaimer in all government publications (including websites) that
list National Memorials or feature the Mojave Cross, but not all
relevant publications will be under its control. At a minimum, the
federal government should use its existing opportunities to inform the
8

See supra Section 111;Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817, 1820 (2010) (Kennedy,
J., plurality opinion); id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring).
1
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public of the cross's long history as a war memorial, and the fact that
it is only "a" WWI symbol, and not "the" WWI memorial for the
entire nation.
Based on available information, it seems reasonably likely that
Congress will pass a bill similar to the one recently introduced. Then
there will be an "official" WWI National Memorial, most likely
located on the National Mall, near those commemorating the Nation's
other major wars. The bill also contemplates additional publicity for
the multiple existing WWI monuments. For purposes of this extended
reflection, assume this to be the case. Once the Mojave Cross is one
among many, and granted less status than several secular alternatives,
its National Memorial designation, standing alone, is unlikely to
violate the Establishment Clause. Taking this as the baseline, the next
Section investigates the final hypothetical.
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL TEST CASE

This final section considers the process if other, equally historic
WWI monuments were rejected as "National Memorials," focusing
on two, very credible candidates. First, WWI was the first war in U.S.
history in which the battlefield graves of Jewish American soldiers
were marked by a Jewish Star. 149 Thus, a Jewish Star WWI Memorial
would symbolize religious liberty and also recall those haunting
battlefield cemeteries in Europe. Second, the Kansas City "Liberty
Memorial" is a secular symbol with a more illustrious, welldocumented WWI-related history than the simple Mojave Cross.
For these private speakers to claim the right to have their own
WWI symbols elevated to "National Memorial" status, they would
need to plead sufficient allegations to show that the Free Speech
Clause protects this form of "speech." While initially this seems quite
impossible, as it turns out, it is merely improbable.
Under familiar First Amendment doctrine, when a government
entity creates a speech opportunity and allows private speakers to
participate, it may create a speech "forum." If it then rejects a speaker
who is within the established content limitations, or fails to establish
49
' See Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United States of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 10, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) ("During World War I, the
War Department determined that the graves of Jewish soldiers who had died in battle would be
marked with the Star of David. Major General Crosby explained in a 1930 address that '[miany
of our heroic dead lie in Flanders Field, Suresnes, Belleau Wood, and elsewhere. The star of
David is mingled with the cross in beautiful and everlasting marble. As they lived together,
fought together, so they lie buried, side by side."' (quoting Jewish Soldiers' Graves To Be
Marked by a Double Triangle Instead of a Cross, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1918, at 22; 72 CONG.
REC. 11064 (June 17, 1930))).
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content limitations, the rejected speaker may claim a Free Speech
Clause violation.so Faced with this claim, the federal government
would be almost certain to assert Summum's expanded "government
speech defense"; it would not willingly relinquish sole discretion over
"National Memorial" designation decisions.
But although these congressional designations appear to be
quintessential "government speech," involving deliberate choices to
form and express the national identity, 5 ' a review of the facts
suggests a more random, ad hoc process. 152 Admittedly, postSummum, there is little chance of a court ultimately recognizing an
alleged "National Memorial forum," but some facts are similar to
those leading the Tenth Circuit to find a "permanent monument
forum." A mix of the realistic and the imaginary serves well to
explore the intersection of the Establishment Clause and the
expanding government speech doctrine.
First, the legislative designation process for National Memorials is
frequently driven by private speakers who are passionate about a
specific commemorative message, and not by any formal or wellconsidered congressional selection process. To take a recent example,
the "Flying Cross National Memorial" illustrates both private sector
involvement and the political nature of these laws. The
"Distinguished Flying Cross" was the first U.S. military aviation
award, and it was given retroactively to WWI military aviators, who
were the first to use planes in battle. 5 3 The project originated with
individuals, and gradually came to involve first local, and then state
representatives, and eventually the local congressman, who suggested
seeking National Memorial status. 15 4
150See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(discussing the Student Activities Fund at the University of Virginia as a forum); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (discussing a student forum created by the University of
Missouri).
' See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995) (discussing how symbols are used in national identity formation).
152 Compare Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (government "control" of the message is the
key element for declaring mixed government-private speech to be "government speech").
53

1 See THE DFC NATIONAL MEMORIAL, http://www.dfcnationalmemorial.org/ (last visited

Mar. 31, 2011); Distinguished Flying Cross National Memorial Act, H.R. 2788, 111th Cong.
(2010) ("To designate a Distinguished Flying Cross National Memorial at the March Field Air
Museum in Riverside, California.").
54

'

See Society History, THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS SoC'Y, http://www.dfcsociety.

orgfhistory.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
Two other examples include the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C., and the National AIDS Memorial Grove. The National Law Enforcement
Officers Memorial was initiated by detective Donald J. Guilfoil, then fifteen national law
enforcement organizations worked with Congress to pass legislation designating the National
Memorial; these organizations also were responsible for designing the Memorial, finding the
site, and raising the funds to build the Memorial. The Dream That Became Reality, NAT'L LAW
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Second, the research suggests that, at least in some instances,
Congress exercises little control over the "messages" of its National
Memorials. Summum did loosen this "government speech"
requirement to "final approval authority."ss But while a City Council
vote to accept a "Ten Commandments" monument reflects some
legislative knowledge of the new display's content, 1 6 this does not
seem to be the case for all of Congress's National Memorial
designations. Two relevant examples, the 2002 Mojave Cross
designation and the 2004 designation of "America's National World
War I Museum," merited just a few lines in voluminous annual
defense appropriations bills, and neither had any legislative history.
So there is nothing to indicate that anyone, besides the bills' sponsors,
was even aware of voting to bestow these honors.
Indeed, the sense one gets from reading these accounts is that the
National Memorial honor relates more to retail politics than to any
particular criteria, or even to a uniquely high level of national status.
While certainly many well-known icons are included, this designation
also has been awarded to obscure monuments with far less, or even no
national recognition. One of the better examples of this is the
"National Military Working Dog Teams Monument." 57
So, there actually is a plausible basis for the private groups who
sponsor the Liberty Memorial and the hypothetical Jewish Star
Memorial to allege a Free Speech Clause claim, asserting their right
to have their monuments similarly designated. The federal
government likely would fight to retain complete discretion over
grants of "National Memorial" status, and so would assert the
"government speech doctrine" as its defense.

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEM'L FUND (Apr. 10, 2000), http://www.nleomf.org/newsroom/
news-releases/the-dream-that-became-reality.html. Similarly, the National AIDS Memorial
Grove was conceived in 1988 by a small group of San Francisco residents. Ground restoration
began in 1991, supported by private funding from the Grove Endowment, and the site was
designated as a National Memorial in 1996. Learn More About the Grove, NAT'L AIDS MEM'L
GROVE, http://www.aidsmemorial.org/history (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
issPleasant Grove City v. Summun, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (internal quotations
omitted).
156See id. at 1133 (quoting IMLA Brief, supra note 31, at 21) (noting that an IMLA survey
documented municipalities' editorial control through a variety of factors, including '"prior
submission requirements, design input, requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative
approvals of specific content proposals').
157National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 2877, 122 Stat. 3, 563-64 (2008) ("[A] national monument to honor the sacrifice and service
of United States Armed Forces working dog teams that have participated in the military
operations of the United States."); see also NAT'L WAR DOGS MONUMENT, INC., http://www.
nationalwardogsmonument.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
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In the end, based on the factors outlined in Summum, a court is
more likely than not to hold that National Memorial designations are
"government speech," rather than any type of speech forum. Like
monuments, these congressional declarations are an inherently
expressive context.158 And anyone aware of the designation would
reasonably assume that the federal government is both speaking, and
conveying its approbation.159 Congress does vote on these proposals,
and at least the bill's sponsors intend to convey a message of special
honor. At a minimum, the 2002 National Memorial Act appears to
communicate Congress's agreement that a longstanding Christian
cross in the desert is an appropriate symbol with which to honor
American participation in World War I.
What these alternative speech claims add to the endorsementanalysis mix, then, is the way in which the "government speech
defense" puts the government in an indefensible position. It would be
required to assert affirmatively that adopting the majority religion's
preeminent symbol, the Christian cross, is preferable to using the
secular, or the minority religion, symbol, to commemorate the U.S.
role in World War I. When the alternatives have equal or superior
historical value, judged objectively, then the government's preference
for the Mojave Cross would unavoidably convey sectarian
discrimination.
This hypothetical also shows how rejected speakers can provide a
kind of functional limit for sifting through government speech
claims.160 While there are no general selection "criteria" for National
Memorial decisions,16 ' each specific designation act states Congress's
commemorative purpose for the honor granted. Once there is an
expressly stated purpose (e.g., commemorate WWI), then whether a
particular government expression is primarily religious or secular can
be tested by Congress's compliance with its own stated statutory
purpose. When the only meaningful difference between proposals is
their religious content (or lack thereof), then a rejection will tend to
prove that the honorary status is based on religion. In that situation,
5

" 8See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 ("A monument, by definition, is a structure that is

designed as a means of expression.").
159 See id. ("When a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the
structure.").
60
' See supra at Section I (discussing references to role of criteria in government speech
cases in Summum opinions of the Court (Justice Alito) and Justice Breyer).
161The only general criteria located for National Memorial is quite expansive and
amorphous: they commemorate "a historic person or episode." Designation of National Park
System Units, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011).
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the government would be left with nothing more than the nakedly
unconstitutional claim that the Christian symbol better represents the
national identity-or (and perhaps even worse) that it is more
consistent with the image the government administration seeks to
present to the world.16 2
This is the point at which Justice Souter's apocryphal prediction
reenters the stage. 163 Because the Establishment Clause remains the
one clearly acknowledged limit on the new broad "government
speech doctrine," governments will try to explain their choices in
secular terms. But in the hard test case, where the stated historical
rationale rings false in light of rejected speakers, a government's
effective choice is plausibly explained only by a religious preference.
To escape this dilemma, at some point, there will be some
government actor who will end up claiming that the "government
speech doctrine" frees government from Establishment Clause
restrictions on religious viewpoint discrimination. While most courts
would hold that claim unconstitutional, some will be attracted to
claims that are allegedly predicated on community or national
ideyntity, but actually are indistinguishable from assertions of
national or local religious identity. As illustrated by the hypotheticals
explored in this Article, there is a thin, but recognizable, dividing line.
When the new government speech defense is used to justify religioushistorical speech, remembering Justice Souter's warning may provide
a useful caution.

62

1 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 ("The City has selected those monuments that it wants

to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who
frequent the Park... The City's actions ... unmistakably signify[] to all Park visitors that the
the monument to speak on its behalf.").
City intends
63
' See id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussed supra Part II).
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